DEMYSTIFYING LEGAL PEDAGOGY:
PERFORMANCE-CENTERED CLASSROOM
TEACHING AT THE CITY UNIVERSITY
OF NEW YORK LAW SCHOOL
John Delaney*
INTRODUCTION

The proliferation of roles that lawyers perform in our modern culture underlies the discussion about the ends of legal education and the myriad views as to what and how law professors
should teach in law schools. This essay sets forth one approach
to answering the following questions: Which primary end of legal
education should law professors pursue? What should law
professors teach, and how should they teach it? I detail my pedagogic choice for a performance-centered approach to develop
the array of interlaced doctrinal, analytical and critical skills in a
more enabling and humane classroom culture. This approach
has emerged through my experience teaching three third-year
courses and the first-year criminal-law course in the innovative
program at the City University of New York Law School.'
The novel features of this approach include a more studentcentered teaching and learning method that stresses a short, written analysis by each student as the centerpiece of most classes,
* Associate Professor of Law, City University of New York Law School at
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I wish to thank the following persons for assistance with this essay: my colleagues at the CUNY Law School, especially Cheryl Meyer who has helped to de-

velop and implement these ideas into courses; Susan Carpenter and Peter
Margulies; Ali Khan of the Washburn University Law School; CUNY law students,

Shawn Boatright, David Campbell, James Glynn and Earl Moore; a CUNY computer specialist, Eilish Egan; and my wife, Lisa Blitman, Esq.
I The City University School of Law, founded in 1982, has a special focus and
mission. As stated in the beginning of its Brochure: "The faculty and staff of CUNY

Law School at Queens College believe that we have a responsibility to help create a
bar that is more diversified, and more representative of the full range of peoples
that make up New York City and the United States. Accordingly, we actively seek to
recruit, employ, retain, promote, and train students, faculty, and staff of all races,

national origins, classes, and belief systems, without regard to sex or sexual preference. This commitment is reflected in all that we do, beginning with our admissions policies: we look at the whole applicant in accordance with the broad and
inclusive criteria approved by the Board of Trustees of the City University of New
York, described in detail elsewhere in this Brochure." 1990-1991 CUNY LAw
SCHOOL AT QUEENS COLLEGE BROCHURE 3 [hereinafter BROCHURE].
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rather than the traditional oral exchange about appellate cases
between the instructor and some students while most other students listen and mentally react to the exchange. Moreover, the
approach presents a more collaborative learning experience that
includes systematic student critiques in small groups of their
written analyses and comparisons of those analyses with a
teacher-prepared model analysis.2
2 The core principles underlying and animating this analysis can be explicitly
stated:
1. Choices from the array of primary ends that may be served by
legal education are inevitable for teachers and law schools. These
choices should be informed by the variety of perspectives on such
choices.
2. A teacher's choice of pedagogic approach, method and technique is not simply a matter of cogitating on the spectrum of such
approaches. Such choice should also be informed by the embedded
choices of the law school and its faculty, its history, its stated goals,
the professional roles traditionally filled by its graduates and their
hopes and aspirations.
3. Each teacher is responsible both for her teaching and for the
learning of her students and thus must continually reflect on her
teaching and their learning.
4. Each student is responsible for her own learning and thus
must continually reflect as to how she learns.
5. Teaching and learning are intrinsic moral enterprises and,
therefore, teachers, to serve their students and to avoid becoming unwitting hired guns for the status quo, should include critical perspectives that promote moral, as well as technical, assessments of existing
jurisprudence, doctrine and practice.
6. Legal theory, history and practice all require that the teaching of doctrine, especially in the third year, should transcend narrow
subject-matter categories and the substantive/procedural dichotomy
because such dichotomies are "false and unworkable."
7. An emphasis on written performance, in some form, is one
excellent means for teaching and learning that stresses blended doctrine and skills, blended doctrine from different subject-matters and
blended substance and procedure.
8. Because active learning is more effective than passive learning, each course and class should exemplify active learning. An emphasis on systematic written performance exemplifies active learning
by automatically "calling upon everyone" to write for each class, by
systematic role playing by each student in each class, and by creating a
course expectation that promotes heightened preparation for each
class.
9. Active learning is also promoted by an emphasis on structured written performance, which can alter the course and classroom
culture from a personal effort stressing teacher-centered learning (all
eyes on the professor) to a teaching and learning enterprise that also
stresses self-learning and collaborative learning by students teaching
one another from materials, problems and model answers.
10. The teacher's responsibility is to help students unfold the
complex historical, jurisprudential and doctrinal complexity embed-
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My approach and pedagogic choice are not presented as
"objective," the result of scientific research, or as recommendations for all teachers in all law schools. Rather, the thesis is that
my experience at the CUNY Law School illustrates one path for
determining what and how to teach in American law schools at
the end of the century, and thus, may interest those seeking their
own paths through the thicket.3 Underlying my approach and
choice are my twenty years of experience in teaching many different law-school courses and some prior teaching of social science
subjects. 4

In exploring these questions, I start by recognizing that lawyers perform amazingly diverse professional roles in our culture.
They practice law in a multitude of settings: as solo practitioners,
in small, medium-sized and large law firms, 5 in corporate law deded in virtually any area of law; not to mystify this challenge by adding
artificial complexity or obscurity through "hide-the-ball" teaching.
An emphasis on learning by modeling, written performance and
model analyses so that students can routinely verify their progress or
lack of it, offers one alternative to the affliction of hide-the-ball teaching.
11. Doctrine and related lawyering skills should be presented
from challenging basics to complexities. The required written performance, therefore, should embody this progression, which, step-bystep, also builds student confidence in their learning, analytical and
performance skills.
12. Because the traditional dichotomy between teaching doctrine and skills is "false and unworkable," the teacher should explicitly blend the teaching of doctrine with related legal reasoning skills in
each class.
13. For many students, the learning of analytical and performance skills requires repetitive written practice.
14. Discourse with a diverse student body should and does
change the discourse of legal teaching and learning.
3 My assumption is that there are many such path seekers and many such paths.
4 I have taught or co-taught courses in Advanced Constitutional Law (First
Amendment), Criminal Law, Advanced Criminal Law, International Criminal Law,
Comparative Criminal Law, Legal Methods, Legal Analysis, Advanced Legal Analysis, Sociology of Law, CriminalJustice Planning and Reform, Correctional Planning
and Reform, and Police Administration. Prior to law school teaching, I taught the
following social science courses at Fordham University: Introduction to Sociology,
Sociology of Knowledge and Criminology.
5 One estimate is that of the 650,000 lawyers in the country, 420,000 are in
private practice. MARK BYERS, DON SAMUELSON & GORDON WILLIAMSON, LAWYERS IN
TRANSITION, PLANNING A LIFE IN THE LAw (1988). The list of legal specialties includes: Securities, Tax, Antitrust, Patents, Banking, Public Utilities, General Corporate, Probate, Municipal, Admiralty, Civil Litigation, Labor, Real Estate,
Commercial, Environmental, Personal Injury, Civil Rights/Civil Liberties, Criminal, General Family, Debtor/Creditor, Condemnations, Landlord/Tenant, Divorce
and Poverty. Id. at 18-19.
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partments, 6 and in government agencies ranging from a solo district attorney's office to vast official bureaucracies like the United
States Department of Justice and huge private/public bureaucracies such as the Legal Aid Society of New York.7 Many thousands
of other lawyers perform as chief executives, commissioners,
judges, legislators and legislative aides at the village, town, city,
county, state and federal levels. While constituting a smaller
group, others teach in law school, or in undergraduate and graduate criminal justice, business and political science programs.
Many other lawyers work in business or as agents, mediators and
arbitrators.8
Given the diversity of work that lawyers actually perform, the
lack of consensus about the ends of legal education is understandable and presents law teachers with the challenge of choosing which primary goal to pursue.9 These pedagogical choices
become more complex because, in addition to the diversity of
work that lawyers perform, there is a corresponding diversity of
perspectives about how lawyers should carry out these varied activities, the comparative value of such activities, and how best to
prepare students to perform them. Consider, for example, a professor who chooses to focus on preparing students to "practice
law." In customary form, this focus leads to an emphasis on
"thinking like a lawyer" with traditional doctrine and forms of
legal reasoning as the answer to "what" professors should teach.
This probably entails some form of the Socratic method of decoding cases and statutes as the response to "how" professors
should teach. But in more recent reformist garb, the identical
focus also leads clinical and other legal educators to favor simulation, field and clinical education because these methods more
closely resemble what many lawyers actually do in practice.' °
Ninety thousand lawyers work for corporations. Id.
Sixty thousand lawyers work for the government. Id.
8 Eighty thousand lawyers work in teaching and miscellaneous categories. Id.
9 Different approaches to lawyerly functions in our society have been prevalent
since the beginning of systematized legal education started in the 1870's at Harvard
and Yale Universities. A broad view, however, is revealed by what Chief Justice
Vanderbilt described as the five essential functions of a great lawyer: counseling,
advocacy, improving the profession (including the courts and the law itself), leadership in molding public opinion, and the unselfish holding of public office. Arthur
T. Vanderbilt, The Five Functions of the Lawyer: Service to Clients and the Public, 40
A.B.A.J., 31-32 (1954).
1o See, e.g., BROCHURE, supra. note 1 at 9-10. As the CUNY brochure points out:
The work of the Houses continually places students in the roles of
lawyers, confronted with responsibilities that intersect with substan6
7

tive material from the courses .

.

. students learn not only to take a
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A law teacher, such as Roscoe Pound," may view lawyers essentially as problem solvers in diverse settings. Consequently this
teacher will prepare students for problem solving, both in practicing law and in public and private roles. The answer to "what"
should be taught might also stress pragmatic/realist jurisprudential thinking for problem solving.' 2 The answer to the "how"
question might stress, inter alia, skills in negotiation, mediation
and arbitration that may be usefully applied in problem solving,
especially as an alternative to formal adjudication. If a law
teacher, instead, takes a broad view of "practicing law," including
the many thousands of lawyers who work as chief executives,
judges, legislators and legislative aides, that teacher may prepare
students by stressing the broad policy infrastructure and historical context within which both doctrine and problems emerge,
ripen, evolve and sometimes fade, as well as the landmark cases
and analytical materials that aid in unfolding this policy framework. The principal objective of this teaching approach is to develop finely honed critical skills in policy analysis within evolving
political/historical contexts. These skills can subsequently be apmore active, responsible part in their own education, they learn to
approach the practice of law in a way that is active and responsible as
well . . . the three-year progression of courses expresses the broad

concept of "clinical education" to which the Law School subscribes.
One or another variety of clinical study is a part of the program of
every student throughout the three years.
Id.
Criticism of both the strengths and limits of legal education has been especially
acute over the past fifty years. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Lawyer's Ways and Means
and the Law Curricidum, 30 IOWA L. REV. 333 (1945). Llewellyn noted four main
points about law curriculum in the 1940's that he attempted to modify in his own
teaching practice while at Columbia University and the University of Chicago. The
first is that the curriculum was "not doing its work." Id. at 333. Second, the limitations of the curriculum included graduating students with some knowledge of prevailing legal doctrine but who were ill equipped to the "practice of law." Id. Third,
Llewellyn opined that, by nature, the legal curriculum is a compromise between the
"demands for legal information and the demands for inculcation of craft skills." Id.
at 334. And lastly, that "curriculum implied a reasonably standardized, communicable, body of ways and means sufficiently organized and policed to get results
throughout the whole body of prospective graduates." Id. at 335.
For other relevant works by Llewellyn, see KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE
BUSH (8th ed. 1981); Karl N. Llewellyn, On What is Wrong With So Called Legal Education, 35 COLtJM. L. REV. 651 (1935).
11 Roscoe Pound, The Califora RealistJurisprudence,44 HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931).
12 For further discussion of Pound's contention regarding lawyers' roles in our
society, and the tasks of teaching law students to prepare them for their careers, as
well as Llewellyn's criticism and response to these views, see John W. Van Doren,
Implications ofJurisprudence to Law Teaching and Student Learning, 12 STETSON L. REV.
613 (1983).

19921

PERFORMANCE-CENTERED TEACHING

1337

plied in practice and in public and private roles. 13
Yet other teachers may choose to emphasize history, a liberal
arts emphasis on the theoretical content of law or what the law
ought to be, either from traditional natural law and utilitarian
perspectives' 4 or from newer jurisprudential perspectives rooted
in feminism, 1 5 economic analysis or critical legal studies. 16 Indeed, as doctrine explodes in many areas, one entirely defensible
response is to go deeper into such theoretical frameworks rather
than race superficially through a mass of doctrine in an inevitably
doomed effort to present most of it. Given this multitude of
competing purposes, choice of a dominant purpose or purposes
is inescapable.
Clearly, each choice of a distinctive primary end of legal education leads to related choices concerning "what" should be
taught and "how" it should be taught. Choice is inevitable in
these areas as well, whether there is conscious awareness of the
scope of available options or not. Indeed, conscious choices are
postulated as superior to implicit choices that are made without
considering the scope of possibilities. With awareness of the
need for choice, there can be an explicit weighing of the advantages and disadvantages of each option in light of the instructor's
experience, knowledge, skills and jurisprudential commitments.
Moreover, the instructor's view of the history and current situation of her law school and its students becomes important. This
professorial clarity can be specifically communicated to students,
thereby giving them fair notice as to the course's end, substance,
13 Clearly, these categories are not distinct and mutually exclusive-there are
numerous shadings and overlapping. To illustrate, while all lawyers need critical
skills, the nature and scope of such skills varies dramatically. There are real differences, for example, between the practical and case-oriented critical skills required
in representing a criminal defendant at sentencing and the policy-oriented critical
skills required in legislative assessment of the validity of any sentencing range, the
purposes to be served thereby and the range of alternatives.
14 For an introduction to the importance of these traditional jurisprudential perspectives in making sense of the first year of law school, see JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING, BRIEFING, ANALYSIS AND THEORY 154-66 (1983).
15 See, Elizabeth M. Schneider, The Dialectics Of Rights And Politics: Perspectives From
The Women 's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 589 (1986); Catherine A. MacKinnon, Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Toward FeministJurisprudence, 8 SIGNS 635 (1983,
1987); Janet Rifkin, Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy, 3 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 83
(1980).
16 See, e.g., Robert W. Gordon, CriticalLegal Histories, 36 STAN. L. REV. 57 (1984);
Allan C. Hutchinson & PatrickJ. Monahan, Law, Politics and the CriticalLegal Scholars:
The Unfolding Drama of American Legal Thought, 36 STAN. L. REV. 199 (1984); Ed
Sparer, Fundamental Human Rights, Legal Entitlement and the Social Struggle: A Friendly
Critique of the Critical Legal Studies Movement, 36 STAN. L. REV. 509 (1984).
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methods and materials. Such clarity may also be contagious
among colleagues.
Because these choices impact upon students, as do the curriculum and pedagogy of the school, they are not simply personal
choices expressing the teacher's experience and preferred jurisprudence and pedagogy. Students must rely upon and are surely
impacted, for better and worse, by instructors' choices. Therefore, these choices must have clear moral content. Thus, a
teacher should be ready to explain and to justify those choices,
first to oneself, then to colleagues and to students. The premise
is that choices that have intrinsic and inescapable moral content
should be made in light of the interests of the students, the
faculty, the institution and oneself. An inevitable corollary of this
premise is that moral conversation about such choices, at least
with oneself and ideally with colleagues and students, is unavoidable. No teacher is an island unto herself: her choices influence
colleagues and their choices; and the web of faculty choices enmeshes students and the school for good and ill.
To begin this conversation, institutional context is essential.
Key questions include: Is a clear choice as to the primary end of
legal education inherent in the history of the law school, its students and the interests it serves? Does the current faculty, in
whole or in part, support or acquiesce in this embedded history,
in its particular culture? What is the impact of these historical
choices, exemplified in the school culture, upon the current student body as well as the stream of future students soon to come?
To analyze these questions, other questions are generated:
Who are the students in terms of class background, education,
learning, and analytical and performance skills? What are their
aspirations upon graduating from law school? What have their
predecessors done upon graduation? Do professorial choices
empower these students to fulfill the lawyerly roles they historically undertake upon graduation? Do professorial choices ignore
student needs, largely or partially, and emerge from a prism centered mostly on meeting the instructor's ideological and pedagogic needs? How does one teacher's choice of primary end
relate to the choices made by other teachers, in the same year
and in other years? How do these choices fit the school's historical mission? Lastly, is there an obligation on first-year teachers
to stress foundational skills so that virtually all conscientious students are enabled to acquire a common legal grammar, vocabulary and mode of discourse, a springboard for advancing to more
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complex forms of legal discourse and materials? By such empowerment, students are better able to make their own choices
about electives, summer employment and initial career choices.
Inherent in asking, reflecting upon and responding to these key
questions is engagement with the art and craft of teaching and
learning.
INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE

At CUNY Law School, there is a clear and emphatic institutional choice as to the primary end of legal education and to its
choice of school culture. In the words of its catalogue, the CUNY
Law School "gives public interest and public service law the primacy." 7 Indeed, the school boldly seeks to distinguish its curriculum from other curricula by its "rethinking of the nature,
function and structure of legal education. The curriculum represents a reordering of legal knowledge, with an attempt to break
down false and unworkable distinctions between theory and practice, doctrinal analysis and skills development."' 8 This publicinterest choice includes a strong mandate, in the words of Dean
17 BROCHURE, supra note 1, at
18 Howard Lesnick, one of the

5.
architects of the CUNY Law School, describes the

aims of the school as:
[A] dual commitment: to make its educational premises and purposes
explicit, and at the same time open to question; and to design an educational program responsive to its premises and purposes ....

We

sought to address four fundamental aspects of the learning environment:
1. To teach subject matter in ways that integrate, rather than
dichotomize, different fields, in order to facilitate, rather than impede,
the effort to articulate and draw in question the implicit premises and
value choices underlying legal development;
2. To study legal development in the context of lawyering decision-making, in order to encourage students to see that law has significance only in reference to underlying human problems;
3. To study lawyering in the context of moral and political theory, and as an aspect of interpersonal communications, in order to
encourage students to see their task as the mastery of skills that are
not disembodied from questions of identity and values in their work;
4. To actualize students' capacity to be active, reflective learners, in order to create a teacher-student relation that is less role-defined and more empowering of students, so as to enhance, rather than
impair, the capacity of students to adopt in their law practice a less
role-defined, more empowering relation with their clients.
Howard Lesnick, Infinity In a Grain Of Sand: The World of Law and Lawyering As PorIrayed In The Clinical Teaching Implicit In The Law School Curriculum, 37 U.C.L.A. L.
REV. 1157, 1183-84 (1990). There is an overarching purpose for these four goals:
"[T]o enable students to exercise responsibility in the practice of law." Id. at 1184.
Lesnick also acknowledges: "The core meaning of the idea of responsibility is rec-
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Haywood Burns, to open the law school's doors "to women, and
people of color, and others who have historically been underrepresented in the legal profession .... ,,19 This law school mission flows naturally from the City College/City University ideal
of providing access to excellent higher education for immigrant
and other struggling communities.
CUNY's stated institutional choice has led to an important
emphasis upon experiential learning as embodied in simulation,
field and clinical pedagogic methods. The premise is that these
methods best equip students to be effective advocates for the clients they will predominantly represent upon graduation, including tenants, criminal defendants, working and middle class
clients, the homeless, AIDS victims and other disempowered
people. This institutional choice also leads to a pervasive
emphasis not only on learning the law as it is, but also on learning the law as it ought to be, with strong doses of ethical issues as
well as relevant "historical, sociological, and economic
considerations.... " 20
My personal preference for public interest law as the primary
end of legal education is in accord with the institutional choice.
In addition, though definitions and emphasis vary, the faculty
overwhelmingly shares this commitment to public interest law.
These institutional, faculty and personal goals impact upon a student body that is different from most law schools, a student body
that significantly realizes the CUNY mandate to promote access
to legal education for historically excluded groups.2 '
ognizing that the choices one makes as a lawyer (like those one makes elsewhere in
life) affect people's lives." Id.
19 See BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 5.
20 Id.
21 In 1989-1990, the CUNY Law School enrollment included 37.6% minority
students and ranked sixth in the nation in the percentage of minority law students
enrolled. THE OFFICIAL GUIDE TO U.S. LAw SCHOOLs 50-57 (1988-89) (published
by the Law School Admission Council/Law School Admission Services in cooperation with the American Bar Association and the American Association of Law
Schools). The 1990-1991 CUNY Brochure/Catalogue details the diversity:
[The students admitted are] a remarkably rich and diverse group of
... students. Approximately 52% are women, 48% men, the youngest student is 20 years old, the oldest over 60, and the median age is
30; over a third of the class are members of identified minority
groups, and 20 states are represented, although roughly 80% of our
students are New York residents .... All of them, in one way or an-

other, have evidenced a commitment to the special mission of the Law
School.... [F]or the current academic year, we received seat deposits
from 54% of the students we admitted, a figure that is one of the
highest among law schools.
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FACULTY AS PROMOTERS OF DREAMS

For many CUNY law students, becoming a lawyer is a transforming experience, a dream fulfilled for the students and their
families. These students are often the first family members to
obtain higher education, much less to enter professional ranks of
any sort. For these students, becoming a lawyer creates an array
of new personal life possibilities and a different magnitude of familial aspiration. If a parent, uncle, aunt, brother, sister, or
grandparent is a lawyer, the idea of becoming a lawyer, or other
professional, can have vibrant existential reality for young family
members. Such an aspiration becomes part of the family culture,
dreams and goals, and creates a rippling effect that reaches out to
neighbors and even communities that may have relatively few
lawyers who emerge from the community. Thus, each new Black,
Latino, Asian-American or Native American lawyer may empower
not only individuals, but families and entire communities. Each
new lawyer from a disenfranchised group enables the struggle for
equal rights for other people.2 2
The formidable challenge then for the deans and faculty at
CUNY has been to promote this dreaming by creating a curriculum and pedagogy that translates these lofty goals into effective
modes of teaching and learning. For those faculty who are so
inclined, there is an exciting role: to be agents of this transformation, this dream fulfillment. For those who undertake it, the task
has many dimensions of challenge and reward.
First, it is a moral and psychological challenge to commit a
substantial part of one's professional energies, talent and emotions to this enabling task. Second, there is a relentless and complex technical challenge to deepen one's teaching art and craft to
be increasingly effective with an array of students whose "school
BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 5.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that not all students share this formal law
school choice of mission. Though it is hard to pinpoint the exact number, it is clear
that a significant number of students do not share the school's philosophy. They
seek only to empower themselves, to transform their own lives. But given the composition of the student body with many Blacks, Latinos, women and gay students,
this personal pursuit splashes over and impacts families, neighborhoods and larger
communities. The personal here is surely political.
22 Because dreams traverse the landscape of values, there is no expectation that
all students from disenfranchised groups will be committed to empowering their
communities. Indeed, the assumption is that pursuit of virtually any common legal
specialty is useful in providing role models for other members of such communities. Proliferating examples of such role models are also important for the dominant community to experience.
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skills" traverse the spectrum. 2 3 And finally, enabling such students to transform their lives is a powerful source of professional-life meaning and reward. As for myself, a moral and
political dream is engaged: to transmit to students whatever understanding, insights and skills I have acquired in over thirty
years as a lawyer/teacher/writer. For me, the transmission is
charged because so many of the students personify underrepresented groups in the legal profession and many will utilize
their lawyering skills in a public interest form to aid others. The
objective, over time, is to graduate many hundreds of such
lawyers.
CUNY's

CURRICULAR AND PEDAGOGIC CHOICES

In the early 1980's, the organizing faculty and deans' commitment to a public-interest school that placed emphasis on the
rethinking of the nature, function and structure of legal education led them to weigh simulation, house, field placements and
clinical forms as the predominant curricular and pedagogic
method at the school. 24 Those pedagogic choices exemplify the
school's public interest commitment and are detailed and justified elsewhere.2 5 Because I mainly have taught courses, have
only participated in simulations on two occasions and never have
23 CUNY law school students have skills ranging from outstanding to very weak.
While there are very strong students as measured by the LSAT and undergraduate
grade point average scores, many students have modest scores. To illustrate, of the
155 applicants admitted as of March 1991, the median LSAT is 32 and the median
grade point average is 3.04. Admissions criteria have decreased the number of students with very weak LSAT scores. In the class that started in September 1990,
there were seven students admitted with LSAT scores of less than 20. In contrast,
the 1991 graduating class had 27 students with LSAT scores of less than 20. In
addition, the Law School has a serious bar-passage problem with the difficult New
York State Bar Examination. The passing rate for first-time takers from the Law
School has ranged between 43% in 1986 to a low of 26% in 1987. From the 1987
low, the rate has gradually improved to 42% in 1990 and 48.7% in 1991. These
first-time rates compare with a range between 72% and 81% for all first-time takers
during the identical period. The graduates do better, of course, upon subsequent
retaking of the exam. To illustrate, 80% of the first graduating class in 1986 had
passed the bar exam by 1990.
24 BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 9-10.
25 In Howard Lesnick's words:
[Blelieving that revisions in course content and design would not suffice to accomplish the stated purposes, we explicitly made all of the
course work an input to the carrying out of simulated lawyering work.
In what came to be called "Houses," groups of approximately twenty
students worked in association with a faculty member (a "House
counselor") who acted as a senior lawyer-one with the time and
commitment to teach his or her juniors. More than half of first-year
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taught in the clinics, this article concentrates on what should be
taught in such courses and how the courses should be taught.
These questions are formed by the institutional, faculty and personal choices described above. As detailed below, these classes
are, at least in substantial part, somewhat different from the
in name, subject-matter, role
traditional law-school curriculum
26
and structure in the curriculum.
The dominant pedagogic method in large and small classes
students' scheduled "class" week was to be done in the Houses on the
simulations.
We were explicit that, in using simulations as a teaching vehicle,
we were not simply adding the teaching of skills to that of knowledge,
but were seeking to integrate both in a context that emphasized
choice, responsibility for choice and an awareness of purpose. Each
task that students undertook in the simulations had a three-part structure-planning, doing, and reflection. We spent considerable effort
seeking to overcome the tendency to over-emphasize the "doing
phase."
Lesnick, supra note 18, at 1187.
Lesnick explains that one of the repeatedly taught, first-year, month-long simulations, "The Mussel Bay Simulation," was designed to "capture as full a range of
the foregoing purposes as possible; if only once, we meant to show our students
'the world in a grain of sand.' " Id. at 1189-92. Briefly, the simulation concerned:
[A] small group of people who work together as a theater group and
who had recently rented a theater in 'Mussel Bay,' a suburban community. They are interested in buying a house in the community [in
all their names], have found one . . . and have reached agreement on
contract terms with the seller .... [But] a local ordinance and a deed
restriction may each prohibit ownership or occupancy by unrelated
adults. Two of the group are a couple, not married....
Id. at 1189.
Each student, while working alone, with small groups and with the House
Counsellor, acts as:
[A] junior lawyer in a small firm . . . in role . . conducted an initial
interview... prepared a memorandum" concerning "a description of
the client's goal and priorities and a recommendation whether to undertake the representation; prepared a memorandum ... on the legal
issues presented, with an analysis of the options, followed by a letter
to the client counseling opinions; conducted a counseling interview
with the client; and (as client) made a decision among the options.
Id. at 1189-90.
"Out of role," each student, inter alia, prepared reflection memoranda, received feedback from the client and participated in House sessions in which the
counsellor also took part. Id. at 1190. The steps in the process "generated . . .
needs for knowledge of the law," that were met by courses, by House meetings, and
by both individual and small group efforts. Id.
26 For example, in a traditional law school, a first year student will probably
study Constitutional Law, Contracts, Criminal Law and Torts, whereas the different
curriculum at CUNY provides the comparable material in a substantially different
manner as portrayed by these course titles and descriptions. I suggest that these
course titles and descriptions, as all such titles and descriptions, are symbolic and
expressive of ideals and directions rather than a literal description of course subject

1344

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1332

is usually quite traditional, entailing various forms of the Socratic
method with substantial teacher discourse interspersed with
modest to extensive professorial questioning and student answering. This traditional pedagogy can be effective in teaching,
clarifying and integrating doctrine, presenting related modes of
legal reasoning and introducing some critical perspectives for assessing doctrine.2 7 The questioning and answering embodies an
emphasis on oral performance of case skills for those students
who answer the questions, ranging from a few students to as
many as fifteen or more. But this customary pedagogy strikingly
fails to serve two imperative needs in large classes: the need for
systematic active participation by each student in each class; and,
in all classes, the need of many students to learn and to demonstrate in writing their command of a variety of legal reasoning
matter and context. They are significant precisely as expressing different symbols,
ideals and directions:
Liberty, Equality and Due Process, in Historical and Philosophical Context:
This course studies the legal expression of our concepts of liberty and
equality, and our commitments regarding them. It commits significant time and effort to the study of historical events-such as the antecedents of the Bill of Rights in the English and American
revolutionary periods; slavery, the anti-slavery movement and Reconstruction; the reign and fall of White Supremacy; the fear of Communism, 1880-1980; free immigration and the closing of the gate; and
the rise of the labor movement-that have shaped our national consciousness, and the law, with respect to such issues as free speech and
racial equality. The course similarly attempts to connect constitutional concepts to moral and political theory; it studies the First
Amendment as part of the study of liberty, Equal Protection as part of
the study of equality. Explicit functions of the course are to help students overcome the tendency to view law and legal doctrine as simply
a system of analytic reason, and to learn from the experience of grappling with emotionally charged and divisive issues and with values and
perceptions sharply different from one's own.
Law and a Market Economy: This course focuses on the ways that
law shapes and responds to economic transactions between and
among people, acting individually or in association with others. It
studies the traditional core areas of economic activity-Contracts,
Property, and aspects of Torts and Corporations-in ways that address their functional and ideological interrelation, and also introduces students to the study of administrative regulation. The
course is a three-semester sequence.
BROCHURE, supra note 1, at 10-11.
27 For those students who are self-disciplined, who can concentrate and whose
attention span is strong, they can learn well from the oral performance of other
students and from the teacher. Although these students do not speak, they are
participating in a form of active learning. Nevertheless, even with this group of
students, writing a short analysis for class, which becomes a subject for self-criticism and comparison with a model analysis, is clearly a more intense form of active
learning than listening and reacting to others.
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skills corresponding to a variety of doctrine (e.g., from narrow
positivist formulation and analysis to broad policy-oriented or
natural law reasoning).
Gradually, based on my experience with the CUNY student
body from the fall of 1983 to the present, I have developed a
pedagogy that, for me, best embodies the ideal of active learning
by all, or virtually all, students in each class. That pedagogy is a
highly structured, performance-centered approach stressing written analysis as the centerpiece of each class.2 8
The process by which this method emerged from 1983 to
1986 is worth noting. Initially, my approach embodied a typical
conversational mode of teaching: a modified Socratic method in
which I would ask many questions and utilize answers as a basis
for clarifying, elaborating and criticizing doctrine, case skills and
related issues. I gradually became disenchanted with this mode
of teaching because it did not exemplify the ideal of active written performance; there was still too much teacher talk, too little
student talk from the entire class,2 9 and hardly any written demonstration of analytical skills and doctrinal dexterity at all
(outside of law exams). In sum, there was too little active learning and performance by the entire class. In addition, if law is, as I
believe, an important derivative discipline, making appellate
cases the centerpiece for learning deemphasizes the ground of
doctrine in history, politics, economics and culture. Appellate
"snapshots" of what is at stake, of what is "really real," do not
enlighten either the able or the struggling student as to this
ground.
The Socratic dialogue, a single valuable pedagogy, even in
modified conversational form, had become predatory and canniSee Stephen Nathanson, The Role of Problem-Solving in Legal Education," 39J. OF
EDUC. 167 (1989). My discussion highlights the Criminal Law and Legal
Reasoning courses, though I also teach Advanced Constitutional Law where the
problem-solving method is equally effective. For further discussion on using the
technique for a course such as Constitutional Law or any other course, see Robert
P. Davidow, Teaching Constitutional Law and Related Courses Through Problem-Solving and
Role-Playing, 34 J. OF LEGAL EDUC. 533 (1984).
29 In a large class, for example 150-160 first-year students at CUNY, there is an
illusion of outstanding student participation inspired by the fact that perhaps a
dozen, fifteen or even a few more, may ask and answer questions in a single class.
From the instructor's standpoint, the experience is a class with excellent participation. But the overwhelming mass of students in such a class (145/160) have not
asked or answered questions; rather, they have listened with varying degrees of
concentration, discipline and attention span. As classes decrease in size, it is possible to improve the percentage of participants (15/80 or 15/60), but still most students only listen in these classes with "outstanding" participation.
28

LEGAL

1346

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 22:1332

balized other approaches. The oral class dialogue simply did not
enable the mass of struggling students in these classes to acquire
and demonstrate the necessary doctrinal, reasoning and critical
skills. To be sure, those students with excellent learning, analytical and performance skills at the beginning of the course usually
benefitted from the dialogue and performed excellently at the
end. Those with mediocre skills benefitted less and usually performed in mediocre fashion while those with weak skills seemed
to benefit very little and usually performed weakly. It seemed
clear that this teaching approach was inherently biased in favor of
the already skilled and against those struggling to develop doctrinal, analytical and critical skills. Participating in the dialogue by
listening, thinking and speaking from time to time did not enable
them to identify, analyze and correct their weaknesses. In addition, the method seemed to work against those whose temperament and cultural socialization produce shyness and reticence
about speaking out in large groups and arguing for one's position. The Socratic method resulted in predominantly teachercentered teaching, rather than student-centered teaching.
I was also troubled by the gradual realization that the acquisition of these learning, analytical and performance skills appeared to be strongly correlated with the student's economic
class position and the quality of earlier schooling. The SAT and
LSAT results, for example, are correlated with family economic
class position . 3 0 Although there are many individual and some
cultural group exceptions, generally those students from more
affluent class backgrounds have much stronger learning, analytical and performance skills than those from lower economic class
backgrounds. My conclusion was that law school teaching, which
does not address this class-based difference, unwittingly perpetuates these differences and is, therefore, objectively class-biased,
even if the teacher is subjectively well intentioned, unaware of
this result and doing her very best. In contrast, teaching that
promotes the acquisition of this array of skills in basic form is
akin to helping an apprentice carpenter learn to use a saw, hammer and other tools: she can then "go forward on her own." In
other imagery, the potential of performance-centered teaching is
30 See Nader/Nairn Report on the Educational Testing Service, and A Response to
Charges in the Nader/Nairn Report on ETS Feb. 1980 (prepared by Educational Testing Service, Princeton, New Jersey). The ETS critique on the Nader/Nairn Report
concedes that "there is, in fact, a relationship" [between family income and test
results] and concentrates on the claim that "the relationship is more moderate than
[the Report] suggests." Id. at 7.

1992]

PERFORMANCE-CENTERED TEACHING

1347

to get all students on a common springboard of foundational
skills so that they can "jump-start" their own learning.
How

To TEACH: THE FOUR STEPS

What follows is a response to the how-to-teach question-a
detailed description of the performance-centered approach that
emerged during these years. First, one or more mini-problems
are usually distributed to students well before each class. Each
mini-problem is a fact pattern of at least one or two paragraphs.
Some are longer. The solution to each mini-problem requires a
lawyerly analysis that presupposes a good understanding of the
previously assigned materials for that class, including cases, statutes and contextual materials. All students are required to write
an analysis of the problem before the class, typically a lawyerly
analysis of the facts, the issue(s) posed, the governing principle
or rule and the application of the facts to the rule.
In the second step, the class begins with students discussing
their written analysis of the assigned mini-problem in small
groups of three to five students. Many students, but not all, follow a recommended structure for such small-group discussions.
As one student reads her analysis, the other two or three group
members are asked to play the role of student: listening carefully
and asking the reader questions about unclear or apparently incorrect parts of her analysis. The reader/teacher plays the role
of instructor. The underlying premise is that teaching is learn3
ing. If a student can explain her skills-centered understanding, 1
such explanation presupposes a deeper type of learning than that
necessary to recognize the doctrine and issues or merely talk
about them. Thus, in this second step, the ideal is that students
learn from each other by repeated peer-group teaching and active questioning that fosters within each group a cooperative
learning exchange and spirit.32 In addition, those students with
more developed skills than their colleagues, aid those whose
skills are less advanced.
In the third step, one to three students play the role of plaintiff's lawyer, defendant's lawyer or judge by presenting their
31 Skills-centered understanding means that the student can explain and apply
the required doctrine utilizing the relevant legal reasoning forms of analysis including, where appropriate, a critical appraisal of both doctrine and the reasoning.
32 See Gregory L. Ogden, The Problem Method in Legal Education, 34 J. OF LEGAL
EDUC. 654 (1984) (discussing the effectiveness of the problem-solving method and
the use of role-playing to enhance this teaching technique for students).
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analysis/argument to the class. These presentations simulate arguments to the court at pre-trial, trial or appellate stages, or to a
"super-judge" or scholar who decides whether a trial or appellate judge was correct in her decision. When the answers are excellent, I will sometimes ask the student to read her answer
slowly a second time and ask the class to concentrate on understanding exactly why it is excellent. When answers are poor, in
whole or in part, strengths and weaknesses are briefly pinpointed, both in doctrine and in analytical skills (e.g., issue formulating, interweaving, use of policy). These readings usually
trigger student questions and comments about the analyses and
related issues, including the assigned doctrine, relevant skills
and, less frequently, contextual matters such as the underlying
history, politics or economics. In responding to some of these
questions and comments, I strive to be succinct and to resist the
temptation to lecture at length about the issues missed or about
doctrinal matters. My belief that law is mostly a derived discipline leads me to interject the relevant context in history, politics, economics or culture where the specific doctrine triggers
such context.33 Thus, in this third step, students learn from positive modeling of the excellent and good student analyses, negative modeling of the weak analyses, student questions and
comments, and professorial answers and other criticisms.
In the fourth step, a model analysis for the mini-problem is
distributed in class. These model analyses vivify the ideal of a
written, skills-centered understanding, a lawyerly performance
blending two dimensions: form and doctrinal sophistication.
Lawyerly form is illustrated by application of one or more of the
appropriate writing formats set out in my book, How To Do Your
Best On Law School Exams. 34 This series of writing formats is
designed to track positivist, policy-oriented and other jurisprudential modes of formulating, analyzing and deciding legal issues. They correspond to what I call the varying "architectures"
of law and are designed to meet student needs for explicit structures in performing, learning and analyzing. 35 The written law33 For example, that medieval canonists had worked out the basic conceptual
framework between justification and excuse by 1120 A.D., or that the modern rules
of larceny and embezzlement are rooted in medieval history.
34 JOHN DELANEY, How To Do YOUR BEST ON LAw SCHOOL EXAMS (1988). For
other works by John Delaney, see, e.g., JOHN DELANEY, LEARNING LEGAL REASONING,
BRIEFING ANALYSIS AND THEORY (2d ed. 1987).
35 The fact that law inherently exemplifies deep structures or patterns leads to
explicit models for analysis that reflect these structures. These models serve as
road maps for students at basic, intermediate and advanced levels. See DELANEY,
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yerly performance also includes doctrinal sophistication in the
sense of selection and presentation, by elements or tests, of the
precise principle or rule required to resolve the issue(s) posed by
the relevant facts. Thus, in this fourth step, students learn analytical legal writing by modeling such writing or, more likely in
the beginning, by struggling to emulate it.
To aid in this emulation, students are encouraged, individually and in small groups, to compare carefully their analyses with
the model analysis. I also discuss, especially in the early stages of
the course, the essential parts of every lawyerly analysis, including the categories of key evidentiary facts, the parts necessary for
articulating a legal issue, the role of authoritative rules and principles in resolving issues, the application of such rules and principles to the facts and the uses of policy. We also discuss what is
distinctive in a particular analysis, such as the structure of a complex rule statement and its application to resolve the posed issue
by interweaving key facts with the elements of the rule/principle
or relevant tests or factors. Depending on the doctrine and
forms of legal reasoning at stake, I may encourage criticism of
the doctrine, reasoning and underlying assumptions.
After applying this four-step process to the first assigned
mini-problem, we immediately repeat the same four steps in analyzing a second mini-problem. The minimum requirement for
each class is the written analysis of at least one such problem and
often a second problem. In addition, a third or even fourth miniproblem may be orally analyzed, sometimes first in small groups
and sometimes without such discussion. The constant repetition
of the four steps develops and reinforces the learning of doctrine
as well as skill development. While discussing many of the
problems, I introduce other legal reasoning and jurisprudential
issues that are raised by the problem, the relevant doctrine and
related case law. Raising and exploring these doctrinal, legal reasoning and jurisprudential issues enable students to appreciate
more advanced issues and insights that are inherent in the concrete problem and its resolution. Students also learn that theory
and history are embedded, not artificially added, by professors
and that the legal cosmos truly may be in "a grain of sand."
supra note 34, at 31-32, 42-45. While useful for all students, they are essential for
those who crave structures as an escape from what otherwise might seem like a
befuddling randomness and arbitrariness--e.g., appellate decisions that, for the
novice, appear to be without pattern. The failure of many teachers to make these
patterns explicit may be related to the vestigial power of "hide-the-ball" teaching.
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At the end of each class, some students, in accordance with a
distributed weekly schedule, are required to hand in their analyses for written assessment of strengths and weaknesses by thirdyear teaching assistants who work under my supervision. These
assessments, which are written directly on the student analysis
and generally returned within three or four days, promote individual teaching and learning. The assessments promote confidence through the confirmation of evolving strengths and
highlight persistent weaknesses for student follow-up. Because
of the class size, I do not attempt to provide any direct individual
assistance to students. If a substantial pattern of specific weaknesses is revealed in the student analyses, I may address those
weaknesses in class discussion. These regularly submitted student analyses and weekly conferences with the teaching assistants
enable me to verify and correct my class impressions of collective
strengths and weaknesses, to "feel the pulse of the class," and to
attempt corrective action as the course progresses. In addition,
each student receives her mid-term and final exams back with
comments and a teacher-prepared model analysis. Those who
fail or do poorly on the mid-term are urged to seek assistance
from one of the experienced teachers who staff the Professional
Skills Center, which provides individual assistance to struggling
students. Through these means, I seek to make the exams, especially the mid-term exam, a learning experience as well as an
evaluation.
COMPARISON WITH TRADITIONAL METHODS

In traditional law school classes, professors teach by assigning cases and other materials, lecturing, asking questions and
playing off student answers. 3 6 With written performance-centered teaching, students learn in the usual ways-studying materials, listening and mentally reacting in class to the teacher and to
other students, occasionally participating in discussion, taking
notes, reviewing and outlining courses. For many, these usual
methods are sufficient and effective. But for others, these methods are insufficient. Performance-centered learning offers a different approach to the classroom. In addition to the usual
36 Traditional law school classes favor those who learn well by studying cases,

listening in class as others talk, reacting to such talk, occasional participation, note
taking, subsequent scrutiny of such notes, review of the assigned cases and outlin-

ing courses. The performance-centered approach supplements this medley of
methods and techniques with other techniques and with constant opportunities for

students to assess their learning, analysis and performance.
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methods, students learn by struggling to write analytical responses for each class, systematic role playing, collaborative
teaching and learning from each other in small groups. The students also develop skills through reading, listening and reacting
to written analyses in class. Outside of class, students compare
their analyses, mid-term and final exams with model analyses.
Moreover, a modest number of students learn through occasional, individual conferences with the teaching assistants. Because learning theory and research indicate that we learn in
different ways and that multiple modes of learning and feedback
are preferable, it is more effective, in principle, to teach in a way
that provides various modes of learning with regular opportunities for assessing one's strengths and weaknesses. At a minimum,
performance-centered teaching offers one remedy when traditional Socratic methods do not work.
WHAT TO TEACH

While the doctrine presented in my first-year criminal law
course is conventional in scope-including homicide, larceny, inchoate crimes, justification and excuse-the CUNY Law School's
commitment to teaching law in a more integrated approach is
embodied in my third year classes by a cross-cutting doctrinal
approach.
Exemplifying the CUNY rationale, the problems in the thirdyear legal analysis classes are grouped into the overlapping subject-matter categories which attorneys commonly confront, including criminal law and federal and state constitutional criminal
procedure; common law contract and the Uniform Commercial
Code; commercial paper and surety; and wills, trusts and estates.
In addition, the problems in the private law areas typically incorporate at least one issue rooted in civil procedure. The principle,
derived from history, theory and practice, that substantive issues
always have a procedural context, compels a substantive and procedural blend in most problems. In addition, the choreography
of blended substantive subjects flows from the premise that,
though sometimes justified by doctrinal complexity, artificial
compartmentalization "into analytically distinct subject headings," does not prepare students for practice, is theoretically unprincipled and is historically unjustified.
Thus, the overlapping subject matters blended into each
problem enable third-year students to transcend learning in artificial single subject-matter categories that do not correspond
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either to the history, theory or practice of law. Rather, students
emulate the more complex challenge posed by real-life legal
problems, which always present issues combining substantive
and procedural categories and often cross-cut several substantive
realms. Students learn this blend of procedure and diverse substance by playing a particular role in decoding these problems:
lawyer for plaintiff or defendant, or trial or appellatejudge. Such
role playing and blended teaching and learning is preferable in
principle to teaching and learning with the tunnel vision inherent
in single subject matter focus or the unlawyerly pretense of an
undefined "neutral" role.
Because application of the performance-centered approach
requires constant writing and doctrinal analysis for each class,
careful preparation of the assigned sequences, cases, statutes and
related materials becomes a precondition for the class, a sine qua
non. Without this careful preparatory learning, it is manifestly
impossible to decode the problems. In fact, without at least an
initial understanding of the relevant doctrine and related reasoning, even the struggle to decode them is difficult. This reality
creates inherent psychological, moral and peer pressure on students to prepare sufficiently to be able to struggle with the
problems, which is also the minimum course expectation. In
contrast with classes where Socratic and lecture-questioning
methods are applied and the chance of being called upon in a
large class is slight, the application of the written performancecentered approach means that teachers automatically "call upon
everyone" to perform in each class, so that heightened preparation becomes essential. Without it, one simply cannot participate
in the class. Indeed, this heightened preparation becomes an essential element of the different class culture that is promoted by
the performance-centered approach.
In addition to a heightened intensity of preparation, the direction and focus of such preparation changes. For many students, the objective changes-from knowing the materials well
enough to understand and respond to infrequent professorial
questioning to later coping with the exam-to a performancecentered understanding, which enables students to produce a
written, lawyerly analysis. In philosophical terms, this change
embodies the altered ontology of the class. Its essence becomes
a struggle for lawyerly written performance rather than simply
"knowing" the materials well enough to talk about them in class
and write a typical first-draft exam answer at the end of the term.
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ProfessorialPreparation
This heightened preparation and changed focus also applies
to teacher preparation. The need for precisely formulated
problems designed to raise a variety of issues at different levels of
complexity, as well as the need for answers that capture lawyerly
responses to the issues raised, demands meticulous teacher preparation. The intense preparation inherent in the creation of written problems and answers is objectified in the aggregation, over
time, of an expanding set of course problems and answers that
can be fine-tuned each year and used again and again. Thus,
while the initial preparatory effort is probably greater than with
other teaching methods, the required subsequent preparation is
less time-consuming. Eventually, more time gradually becomes
available to refine the course theory, method, technique and
materials, and to pursue research and writing goals.
Building-Block Teaching and Learning
The third-year problems exemplify the principle of buildingblock teaching and learning in two ways. First, the array of
problems illustrate a building-block approach to learning by posing issues at escalating levels of complexity and challenge. Second, each problem itself is a building block in a sequence of
problems that begin at a challenging but straightforward level
and gradually become more difficult.
As to the first meaning, each third-year problem usually
presents four or five primary issues. In addition, the problem
may contain up to four secondary issues. The primary issues customarily present a range of difficulty that begins with a challenging initial issue. In tort negligence, to illustrate, it might be a
forthright example of clear tort negligence-e.g., a motorist
looking away and causing injury to another. In contract, a
straightforward example of a valid or invalid offer and acceptance
may be used. In criminal law, a basic example of felony murder
involving robbery and larceny as well as homicide is typical.
Though the doctrine may be straightforward or even simple, for
many students these initial issues are nevertheless challenging
because they require not simply doctrinal knowledge, but rather
a skill-centered understanding that leads to a lawyerly performance, including skills in issue-identifying, rule application and interweaving. Because skills are necessary for performance and
cannot simply be reduced to their knowledge dimension, a formidable challenge for many first-year students is the blended doc-
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trinal/skills performance needed to resolve the basic issues
presented in the initial tort negligence or contract problem.
The need for this blended doctrinal/skills performance explains why a significant number of students, not only first-year
students, experience serious difficulty in mastering straightforward doctrine such as intentional torts, intentional homicide or
offer and acceptance. If they are conscientious, they can probably memorize, even understand, the driving policy and elements.
They can often discuss these areas and are convinced that they
"know" the doctrine well. They cannot, however, apply their
doctrinal knowledge by identifying the issues, selecting the applicable rule or principle, interweaving key facts with elements or
tests to resolve the issue, applying applicable policy in different
ways and performing all these tasks with lawyerly writing. They
also have difficulty applying the doctrine to a series of varying
fact patterns. In short, they lack the skills-centered understanding essential to a skills-centered, lawyerly performance. Often,
this absence of a skills-centered understanding and performance
is also correlated with the absence of skills-centered learning.
When students experience difficulty in acquiring this skillscentered doctrinal understanding and embodying it in a skillscentered performance, the response is to require the student to
decode and analyze other problems of at least comparable difficulty rather than struggling with easier problems. Students cope
with difficult problems in various ways: self-learning, learning
from each other, repetition and reinforcement, continuous struggling to perform the lawyerly tasks necessary to decode and answer the issues in difficult problems, and relentless effort, often
met with initial failure but rewarded by eventual success for the
persistent.
For some students, however, persistence is not enough.
They also need individual assistance to identify and correct deficiencies. The relatively modest number of conscientious students in this category sometimes benefit from a few individual
37
sessions and are then able to progress on their own.
37 Despite these efforts, a modest number of students fail each term and a few
students are given near-fail evaluations. With only occasional exceptions, most students who fail or do poorly do not apply themselves conscientiously, sometimes
because of life complications. The inescapable conclusion, however, is that most
students learn well from this approach: the strong get stronger and the weak improve their skills.
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From Teacher-Centered Class Learning to Student-Centered Learning
It is not only problems that are objectified: teaching and
learning are also objectified by transforming the reliance mainly
upon the teacher as a fount of information, analysis and evaluation, into a view of the teacher as architect and general contractor
of a teaching and learning enterprise in which students play an
active and major role in self-teaching and peer group teaching.
Students do not simply engage with the teacher: they engage intensely with themselves and each other by individually unraveling
the problems, partaking in small group discussions, and question
and answer sessions with the teacher, and again with themselves
in confronting their strengths and weaknesses as revealed
through repetitive comparison of their analyses with the model
analyses.
Thus, the politics and ambience of class culture are changed.
The hierarchical relation of each student with the teacher is complemented by regular student-to-student interaction. By rejecting the "teacher-as-fount-of-wisdom" ideal, the teacher
becomes a facilitator of self-learning and small-group learning, a
"coach" of the students who play the role of performers, what I
call lawyers in training. In addition, with its emphasis on individual performance in each class as an important key to learning,
this method operationalizes the ideal that each student is responsible for her own learning. Students discover that repeated efforts at written classroom performance promote more effective
learning than listening to teacher talk, listening and reacting to
others respond to professorial questions or even personally responding to questions in an occasional class.
The repeated lawyerly performance also exemplifies active
learning and rejects passive learning. While I ask a fair number
of questions and answer student questions, I seek to exercise restraint and usually resist impulses to talk at length, answer interesting but irrelevant or hypothetical questions, or even
encourage or permit a proliferating series of questions unless
they are of extraordinary quality.
Central to the journey from teacher-centered learning to student-centered learning is the principle of mutual aid embodied in
the small-group learning partnerships that are an integral step in
the four-step process applied in class. Initially, the ideal of personal responsibility for one's learning unfolds in self-help and
self-learning. This ideal is enriched by another ideal-mutual aid
that unfolds in small group learning. Thus, the learning experi-
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ence in each class entails both a collaborative enterprise and an
individual effort.
By rejecting any notion of exclusively individual learning,
the emphasis upon collaborative learning also expresses a moral
ideal inherent in the CUNY Law School's philosophy. In learning, as in life, collaboration and caring are critical dimensions of
the struggle for a civilized existence. Whatever teachers and students do together has inescapable moral significance: whether
they struggle together to aid and empower one another to
deepen their understanding and skills or, at the other extreme,
wage warfare upon one another by seeking to harm one another's
learning.
Because of this transformation of teaching and learning into
an enterprise, the quality of the classes is stabilized at a higher
level. In contrast to classes dominated by teacher talk with many
questions and student responses, there is less unpredictability
and fewer classes that vary sharply in quality or effectiveness.
Moreover, there is far less vulnerability to idiosyncratic and fortuitous factors such as teacher, student or class personality, temperament and transient moods, the lingering effect of the prior
class, winter "blues" and so forth. For example, the fact that the
teacher may be experiencing an "off" day has less impact when
teaching and learning is less hostage to the teacher's personality
and mood-the students can still perform well even though the
coach is in a slump. The excellence that is gradually built into
the problems and analyses over time and the cultivated skills and
habits of students in carrying out the four-step process mostly
transcends personalities, moods and temperaments on a particular day.
Teaching Students with Sharply Varying Skills
The performance-centered approach also offers one response to the challenge posed by a class filled with students at
sharply different skill levels. The reason is that problems can embody facts that raise issues at sharply different levels of difficulty.
Thus, the first mini-problem in a first-year criminal law topic can
present an initially challenging but straightforward issue, while
the subsequent mini-problems present gradually increased magnitudes of challenge. Virtually all students who have prepared
and who have minimum or better skills should be able to decode
the first mini-problem in a doctrinal area and write a lawyerly response, though at quite different qualitative levels. Those stu-
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dents with greater doctrinal and skill sophistication should be
able to decode and write a lawyerly response to the more difficult
second mini-problem, while those with the highest level of doctrinal and skill sophistication can also succeed with the subsequent and most difficult mini-problems.
But all students, especially those with the weakest doctrinal
and skill sophistication, are encouraged to struggle towards excellence and to decode and resolve all problems. Our experience
is that such struggle, when repeated consistently, usually yields at
least an incremental building-block progress that motivates students to continue to struggle, and over time aggregates to demonstrable, sometimes impressive, progress in a semester. I
encourage the view that any student's skill level is a fluid, not
static, reality. Progress in skills is not always gradual and incremental. Occasionally, the repetitive written analyses detail a
breakout to higher skill levels, a surprising, even thrilling, experience for the student that builds self-esteem and self-confidence
about one's capacity to persevere and succeed in learning. The
learning insight that has emerged is that understanding not only
precedes performance as we are trained to believe and ordinarily
expect; sometimes, understanding emerges during the performance, or even trails after it. Thus, repetitive written performance
provides different paths for different students towards the goal of
38
understanding.
Because students are encouraged to view learning as a process aimed at blending skills and doctrinal understanding with
performance, any dichotomizing of learning into two learning
tasks, doctrinal understanding and then a skills-centered performance is discouraged. The tendency of many students, often
those with weaker skills, to reduce the learning of law merely to
knowledge, sometimes even to the utter fallacy of memorization,
is correlated in our experience with the tendency to dichotomize
their learning task into these two consecutive steps.
Thus, by simultaneously engaging all students at different
levels of challenge, the problem method offers one partial rem38 This learning insight reflects the behaviorist emphasis that the way to change
behavior is to focus on the behavior itself, and not to see behavior as an artifact of
the mind. See, e.g., B.F. SKINNER, BEYOND FREEDOM AND DIGNITY (1971). The important point is the recognition that behavior can change before there is complete
understanding of the change, and this insight does not require a rejection of the
conventional emphasis that understanding precedes and ignites performance.
Both approaches can be effective. In athletics, for example, it is not uncommon for
performance to exceed past-based expectations about levels of performance.
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edy for the difficulties posed by teaching a class whose students
range across the skill spectrum, without discouraging the weaker
students or unduly boring the stronger students.3 9
Modeling and Rejection of "Hide-the-Ball" Teaching
The emphasis on written performance with distribution of
model answers is antithetical to any "hide-the-ball" teaching, i.e.,
any approach that intentionally adds obscurity or artificial
teacher-based complexity to the doctrine and legal reasoning
skills presented. Indeed, the distribution of specific direction in
the form of model written analyses is central to the important
learning by modeling dimension of the written performance approach. As noted, students learn, in part, by repeatedly comparing their analysis, in detail, with teacher-prepared model analysis.
In straightforward positivist form, this model analysis includes
focus on both skill and doctrinal quality as expressed, for example, in the statement of the conclusion, the formulation of the
issue, the specification of the governing principle/rule and relevant tests, the interweaving of key facts with the elements of the
principle/rule or tests, the application of relevant policy and the
blending of these parts into an organized and appropriately succinct lawyerly answer. In pragmatic/realist, policy-oriented or
natural-law form, the model analysis varies to reflect these different jurisprudential frequencies.
The repeated comparison of student analysis with model
analysis aids their struggle towards the ideal of excellent analysis
by enabling them, class by class, to identify, analyze and strive to
correct their doctrinal, reasoning and critical deficiencies in light
of an exemplar. Equally important, the students are able to verify their strengths and build upon them, a step that is useful for
all students and essential, even immensely reassuring, for those
lacking in confidence about their skills. Thus, learning by modeling is a key means for students throughout the course to apply
the principle that each person is responsible for her own learning
and each person, step-by-step, should strive to become expert
about it. Students in the first-semester criminal-law class espe39 Student evaluations in the third-year Legal Analysis and Advanced Legal
Analysis courses are almost unanimously very positive and many students have recommended that the courses be mandated. In the first-year Responsibility for Injurious Conduct course (criminal law part), the student evaluations are about 85%
favorable, 10% mixed and the rest are critical.
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cially appreciate the specific direction "as to what is expected" of
them as detailed by the model analyses.
In addition, I reject any notion that it is necessary for law
teachers to add obscurity or artificial complexity to the presentation of doctrinal materials, which typically emerge from evolving
historical, political and jurisprudential frameworks. In sharp
contrast, the teacher's role is seen as aiding students to unfold
the formidable complexity that is usually inherent in the doctrinal materials and its historical and jurisprudential contexts, especially as measured by the ideal of a skills-centered mastery of
these materials that is captured in written performance. The absurdity of adding obscurity or artificial complexity to what is already intrinsically complex is illustrated by the following
example.
Performance and Unfolding Complexity
Unfolding complex doctrine and related legal reasoning
skills through the performance-centered approach is illustrated
in the presentation, possibly in a first-year criminal-law course,
but more likely in an advanced course, of the prohibition of cruel
and unusual punishment embodied in the Eighth Amendment
and many penal codes. 40 The Eighth Amendment cases concerning excessive sentences 4 ' implicate constitutional, statutory and
case principles and rules.4 2 The justifications of punishment,4 3
implicit notions of federalism and separation of powers, and both
activist and restrained conceptions of the role of the federal judiciary are likewise implicated. In addition, historical insight is essential because the landmark constitutional case law stresses both
common-law and constitutional history4 4 as a ground for diverse
arguments, principles and holdings. Because the sentencing of
criminals is also intensely politicized and ideological, it is surely
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution specifies: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
40

punishments inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. See also, NEW YORK PENAL LAW

§ 1.05(4). I have taught this doctrine in advanced courses rather than in the first
year.
41 Compare Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980) with Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983). Both cases are derived from and dispute the principles and reasoning
detailed in JVeems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910).
42 See IVeems, 217 U.S. at 375-82; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 267-80; Solem, 463 U.S. at
281-84, 287-302.
43 Weems, 217 U.S. at 381.
44 Id. at 367-75; Rummel, 445 U.S. at 287-90 (Powell, J., dissenting); Solem, 463
U.S. at 284-87.
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important to point out the political and ideological frameworks,
both to prevent what could be the misleading reduction of sentencing to jurisprudence as well as to illustrate the relentless
choreography of jurisprudence on a stage of history, politics and
ideology.45
Absent an entire course on cruel and unusual punishment,
no teacher has the time to unfold all of the dimensions inherent
in the question of excessive punishment. It is plainly the inescapable responsibility of the teacher, however, to be aware of all
these dimensions and their interaction so that pedagogic choices
to unfold some of them, touch on others and omit yet others are
informed by an awareness of the complex reality at stake. The
presentation of this intricate reality by problems or other methods demands that class unfolding, insight and clarification does
not oversimplify its intrinsic, challenging complexity. Indeed,
deciphering complex legal realities may trigger, even in conscientious and able students, initial befuddlement, anxiety and possible discouragement. These feelings are followed, however, by
gradual understanding accompanied, for some, by a real boost in
learning self-esteem and power as they gradually grasp the intrinsic complexity and exemplify it in written analysis. There is no
need, however, for artificially added professorial complexity.
Problems andJurisprudentialFrame Shifting
The performance-centered approach can and should track
the spectrum of jurisprudential perspectives embedded in the
materials in each course and embedded in the teacher's pedagogic choices. To illustrate, if a teacher of the basic torts course
ordinarily presents intentional torts in concrete positivist form,
stressing the rules and a narrow slice of legal policy, this pedagogic choice can be embodied in a series of building-block
problems that exemplify the predominantly rule-dominated positivist presentation. But if the same teacher presents the realm of
negligence refracted through a predominantly policy-oriented jurisprudential prism, this pedagogic choice, too, can be exemplified in a series of building-block problems presenting the
45 If this illustration of complexity appears "loaded" (not typical of first-year
criminal law courses), consider the complexity of murder and manslaughter, including capital punishment, which is more typically presented in a basic criminal law

course. The topic is embedded with red-hot politics, common-law history, moral

philosophy, justifications of the criminal law, nuanced doctrinal rules and principles, social science theories and research, and a burgeoning and bewildering capital-punishment case law.
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principal policy-oriented issues chosen by the teacher as the focus of her presentation. Moreover, if this same teacher prefers to
present negligence as a blend of intertwined policy and rules, this
pedagogic choice can also be similarly exemplified in a series of
problems blending both broad policy-oriented and narrow ruleoriented issues.
The clear principle is that the performance-centered approach can exemplify whatever explicit or implicit jurisprudential
frequencies inform a teacher's choices as to issues, doctrine and
materials. The presumption is that all pedagogic choices, as indeed all lawyerly arguments and judicial decisions, reflect jurisprudential perspectives, whether or not the teacher, student,
lawyer or judge is explicitly aware of such choice. That the
problems applied in this performance approach can also ring
across the spectrum ofjurisprudential frequencies reflects this inescapable reality and presents abundant teaching possibilities.
Problems also provide an excellent means of directly manifesting and teaching the jurisprudential perspectives inherent in
the course materials as well as in each teacher's pedagogic
choices. More specifically, problems can vividly portray the
frame-shifting possibilities offered by these varying perspectives
and their contrasting modes for formulating facts and issues. Indeed, problems can portray how key facts and issues are constructed from contrasting perspectives into separate frames by
issue formulation that leads to varying analyses and, usually, different conclusions.
More vividly, problems illustrate that any application of core
legal skills always expresses a particular jurisprudential framework. If the construction of key facts into an issue establishes a
particular jurisprudential framework, then it is axiomatic that the
additional skills required to resolve the issue (selection of a principle/rule, interweaving, use of policy and lawyerly writing) will
embody this identical framework. With such awareness, students
gain insight from advanced legal reasoning: that each application
of these core skills inevitably embodies a selected jurisprudential
frame. These core skills are not simply technical with meaning
independent of the jurisprudential frame imposed or
presupposed.
Thus, the unfolding of jurisprudential frame-shifting
through the use of problems introduces jurisprudential depth
into ordinary doctrinal courses. My own experience leads me to
begin with building-block positivist problems that exemplify law
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as "legal engineering" and, gradually, to introduce policy-oriented and justice-oriented problems. Later in the course, I introduce explicit frame-shifting problems and exercises which ask
students, for example, to re-envision a policy-oriented case or
problem from a positivist perspective, or vice-versa. We may also
distribute a simple problem and ask students to argue both sides
from positivist, policy-oriented and justice perspectives. The
conclusion is clear: problems can embody the panorama of embedded perspectives as well as capture pedagogic choices from
this panorama. Indeed, they can offer challenging possibilities
for teaching jurisprudential frame shifting in any course. Hence,
the problem method can be employed to teach all forms of legal
reasoning, not simply the positivist form. The legal and pedagogic imagination of the teacher is decisive.
These frame-shifting exercises that utilize the identical problem or case offer students an opportunity to transform their understanding of legal reasoning from a positivist monolith into a
jurisprudential pluralism. Two powerful insights, much emphasized by many law professors, emerge for students, both for theoretical understanding and for practice, from the experience of
decoding problems that cut across the jurisprudential spectrum.
First, there is a range of vigorous forms of legal reasoning, that
includes, but is not limited to, positivism. Second, rules are epiphenomena: they are important artifacts of the particular jurisprudential perspectives embedded in the particular subject's
doctrinal materials4 6 and are also artifacts of the choice of jurisprudential perspective, explicit or implicit, by the lawyers arguing a case and by the judge deciding it from the available choices
in each subject.4 7
46 To illustrate, a fair measure of legislative and court-made rules are intended
to be strictly interpreted to serve particular policy purposes, while other rules are
intended to be flexibly interpreted to serve other policy purposes. Concrete narrow-textured rules, to be strictly applied, include, for example, the technical requirements for executing wills (signing at the end in front of two witnesses with the
precise verbal incantation, which is designed to prevent fraud); the statute of limitations for civil causes of action and criminal prosecutions to limit citizen exposure to
litigation and liability; or the general criminal-law mandate that penal statutes be
strictly interpreted to restrain state power and preserve liberty by barring flexible
police and prosecutorial interpretations beyond the narrow intent of the legislature. In vivid contrast, open-textured statutory and case rules, to be flexibly applied, "sparkle with words indicating broad principles such as 'equitable,' Just,'
'fair,' 'reasonable,' 'proper' . . . 'restraint of trade' .
or 'best interests of the
child.' " DELANEY, supra note 14, at 154-55.
47 In criminal law and procedure, there are many cases, for example, whose issues may be formulated, analyzed and decided from either a crime control perspec-
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To become lawyers-indeed, to cope with the array of cases
in the first-year casebook-it is essential that all students gradually become aware of this inescapable jurisprudential complexity,
and of the relationship between rule and jurisprudential ground,
if only to understand that a shift in the jurisprudential frame that
is being applied typically changes the formulation of the issue,
the rule applied and the result.4 8 For a slice of students, however, these insights are liberating and even thrilling. They see,
sometimes for the first time, that legal reasoning is not only technical, but is as broad as policy-oriented, pragmatic, utilitarian,
justice-oriented, feminist and critical modes of legal formulation
and analysis. That these varied jurisprudential modes are integrally related to their corresponding general philosophical
frames4" in varied and evolving historical, political and social
contexts demonstrates that law and legal reasoning traverse a
broad terrain of the history-laden human enterprise and that to
be a lawyer or judge is to be a jurisprudent and thus an actor in
the human enterprise.
Limitation of This Form of Performance-CenteredTeaching
There are also disadvantages to this form of performancecentered teaching and learning. First, it is not magical: it does
not work for a significant percentage of the class. In my fall 1991
criminal-law course, 19 of 156 students failed. Second, the transfer of the analytical skills (e.g., in formulating issues, specifying
rules and interweaving) from the criminal law course to other
first-year courses (torts, contracts) is extremely mixed: some are
able to do so, some cannot. Third, those students with the
tive, emphasizing the facts of the crime, or a due process perspective, stressing the
failure of the police to comply with the defendant's constitutional rights. See, e.g.,
Herbert L. Packer, Two Models in the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1 (1964).
48 A classic illustration is the landmark case,Javins v. First National Reality Corp.,
428 F.2d 1070 (1970), in which Judge Wright "substituted a contract framework in
This framework and resulting
formulating the issue in a landlord-tenant case ....
formulation contrasted sharply with the traditional application of a real-property
" DELANEY, supra note 14, at 95. See also K-Mart
framework in issue formulation ..
Corp. v. Cartier, 108 S. Ct. 1811 (1988) (contrasting positivist emphasis on "statute's plain meaning" by Justice Kennedy's majority opinion with Justice Brennan's
policy-oriented emphasis that "a thing may be within the letter of the statute and
yet not within the statute, because not within its spirit, nor within the intentions of
its makers").
49 To illustrate, it is illuminating to see that legal positivism is related to philosophical logical positivism; that pragmatic/realist jurisprudence is related to utilitarianism and pragmatism; and that natural law jurisprudence is derived from natural
law philosophy.
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strongest learning, analytical and performance skills need far less
reinforcement and far fewer repetitions of the four-step process
than students whose skills are mixed or weak. I might use this
performance-centered approach substantially less with a class of
students whose skills are generally very strong. I would then be
able to devote more class time to dissecting additional landmark
cases and their roots. Fourth, this approach eats up class time,
even if students write their responses before class rather than
writing them in class. There is less time available for decoding
cases, for learning and refining the skills of case briefing, analysis
and uncovering case roots. This is a real loss inherent in the application of this performance-centered approach detailed in this
article. To do the problems is to not dissect as many cases and as
much history and context. For anyone committed, as I am, to the
theory that learning and perfecting case skills in a historical context is central to the teaching and learning enterprise in law
school, this loss is troublesome.
Although different, both methods emphasize class performance and, therefore, can complement each other. It is also noteworthy that the skills involved in writing responses to problems
do not necessarily lead to case skills. Lastly, the expenditure of
professorial time can be intense, depending on how frequently
written analyses are collected and assessed and on the number of
individual conferences with students.
CONCLUSION

Any teaching and learning approach informed by the principles underlying the performance-centered approach prods teachers and students to progress towards the ideal of making their
teaching and learning subjects for reflection. Beyond teaching
and learning by writing, role playing, collaboration and modeling
is the ideal of transforming teaching and learning from activities
that one performs in response to school tasks to a subject for
critical life-long reflection and integration, a life-long existential
enterprise demanding moral courage, psychological insight and
pedagogic art and craft. The moral courage for teachers and students is the fortitude to continually assess one's strengths and
weaknesses and to act on that assessment. The psychological insight, in confronting teaching and learning strengths and weaknesses, is to refine insight into one's strengths and one's
evasions, escapes and denials. The pedagogic art and craft is the
experiential challenge, day by day, to refine understanding of
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one's approaches, methods and techniques including critical perspectives. Teaching and learning become then a sensibility, an
inseparable dimension of one's mode of being in the world with
manifest implications for one's moral, emotional and technical
growth.

